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The Origins of Cauchy’s Rigorous Calculus. By Judith V. Grabiner. Cambridge. 
Mass. (MIT Press). 1981. 
Here is a book about Cauchy’s influence on a rigorous treatment of the calculus. 
It is a book issued after some harsh debates in recent reviews and journals over 
the validity of Cauchy’s use of infinitesimals. Such debates originated in a pro- 
posal due to 1. Lakatos that the newly investigated nonstandard analysis of 
Abraham Robinson could be used to justify the arguments of classical authors on 
the calculus [I]. Further clarification of the issues raised in the debate has been 
awaited every since. Consequently, Grabiner’s book is to be welcomed because 
Cauchy is a mathematician who has attracted few detailed monographs from 
historians of mathematics [2]. 
The achievement of a new rigor in mathematics, for which Cauchy is generally 
acclaimed, can be viewed as a practical test in the history of mathematics of 
Kuhn’s theses as advanced, for example, in The Structure of ScientiJic. Revolu- 
tions. The extent to which Kuhn’s ideas are important in Grabiner’s eyes is 
reflected in the conclusion to her book, where she notes that Cauchy “was re- 
sponsible for the first great revolution in mathematical rigor since the time of the 
ancient Greeks” [p. 1661. 
Surprisingly, but for sound reasons, Grabiner does not stress controversial 
questions concerning infinitesimal quantities, nor does she try to deduce from her 
analysis any theoretical consequences related to the history and practice of sci- 
ence in general. Instead, Grabiner concentrates mainly on the technical subject 
indicated by the title of her book, which reflects the familiar addiction of histo- 
rians looking for origins. She also treats her subject in a relatively concise manner: 
166 pages for the text, an appendix consisting of 9 pages translated from Cauchy, 
almost 50 pages of notes written in the usual academic style, I5 pages of biblio- 
graphical references (a rather selective bibliography), with I1 pages for the index. 
Having ascertained the scope of the book (and the title does cover explicitly the 
purpose of the book, if by origins one also includes Cauchy’s rigorous calculus), it 
is appropriate to compare it with others on the subject. For example, in a classical 
work quoted and emphasized by Grabiner herself, namely. C. B. Boyer’s Hisfory 
of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development, it is noted that in terms of “a 
precise definition of the notion of limit,” Cauchy was able to build the theories of 
continuous functions, of infinite series, of the derivative, of infinitesimals of all 
orders, of the differential, and of the integral (the last being defined as a limit of a 
sum). Then, by using the limit concept as a common practical tool, interrelations 
between these notions were proved and explained. In particular, Cauchy estab- 
lished the Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, by which an integral appears as 
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an antiderivative. Moreover, unlike earlier geometrical approaches, Cauchy 
“clearly and definitely” gave the limit concept and the methods of the calculus an 
arithmetical basis. From a broader point of view, Boyer argues that Cauchy 
reversed a tendency going back to the Greeks, for whom limiting states “by a 
vague sense of continuity” would obey the same laws as the variables approach- 
ing them. Boyer insists on the fact that Cauchy put the notion of limit first and 
then deduced from it an acceptable notion of continuity. Subsequently, the new 
important mathematical objects were variables and functions, and in this respect 
Cauchy’s work was the cornerstone from which Weierstrass, Cantor, and Dede- 
kind would later build the body of mathematical analysis as we know it today. 
Grabiner offers a brief summary of Cauchy’s achievements in the first, and 
s)tort, chapter (11 pages), “Cauchy and the Nineteenth-Century Revolution in 
Calculus,” but does not pretend to give a completely new approach to the subject 
y ith newly discovered documents or erudite findings on various influences upon 
Cauchy. Her book, in fact, is intended for the student; it gives flesh to the bare 
b>nes of the subject as it has been covered by Boyer and other historians such as 
E ugac, Hawkins, Grattan-Guinness, Manning, and Youschkevitch. Conse- 
qllently, it is not appropriate in this review to comment upon some inaccuracies in 
ttanslations from Cauchy’s French, the lack of an organized comparison of 
d olzano and Cauchy, or the absence in the text of Youschkevitch’s name in 
ci)nnection with the book Lazare Carnot Savant. 
On the contrary, I should like to emphasize that, as the book develops, Gra- 
biner makes use of a specific approach that seems particularly well adapted to 
illustrate Boyer’s explanations. I think that this approach is best described when 
she notices that the “superiority of Cauchy’s limit concept over that of his prede- 
cessors does not lie only in the explicit definition, but in the use he made of the 
concept in proofs” [p. 781. In other words, to expose the originality of a mathema- 
til:ian, we not only have to consider the definitions introduced and specific innova- 
tiijns made in terminology, but we have to see what practical uses are made of 
them in proofs. This is a decent and straightforward attitude which has not always 
been respected by historians of mathematics, particularly when they are con- 
fronted with the task of describing new paths in the rigorization of some mathe- 
matical theories. 
This approach leads Grabiner to her strongest point when she explains that with 
Cluichy and the calculus we have a “logically connected system of definitions, 
theorems and proofs.” For her, the existence of this organized system clearly 
relates to the Euclidean pattern of rigor, for it reflects the “proof structure of 
Eilclidean geometry” [3]. Beautiful examples of such systems are provided in the 
last two chapters of Grabiner’s book: “The Origins of Cauchy’s Theory of the 
D:rivative” and “The Origins of Cauchy’s Theory of the Definite Integral.” This 
last chapter is very nice indeed, and succeeds in only 23 pages. Naturally it is 
b;/.sed on scholarly works on the subjects, but is written with a more general 
audience in mind. Other technical examples are provided throughout the book, in 
particular in the third chapter. 
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In presenting the algebraic background of Cauchy’s new analysis, Grabiner 
takes the same approach of looking at a whole mathematical procedure being 
displayed at work within one specific domain. Here she focuses on the algebraic 
approximations in some papers by d’Alembert and Lagrange. Again, Grabiner’s 
rich description is particularly useful and she nicely mixes a detailed analysis of 
the technical content of a paper with more general information in a pedagogically 
satisfying way, never forgetting to fashion her conclusions properly. Therefore, 
readers will certainly be convinced of the influence of numerical (and quite theo- 
retical) approximation procedures due to Lagrange, for example, and transposed 
by Cauchy into theoretical tools to obtain existence proofs, notably one for the 
Intermediate Value Theorem. These descriptions are very helpful, particularly for 
students of mathematics who wish to become acquainted with some general and 
useful procedures drawn from the history of mathematics. 
However, it must be added that Crabiner was not systematic enough in this kind 
of analysis, where a critical approach to both definitions and proofs should be 
related to the generality of results being obtained. 1 shall just mention one example 
dealing with Cauchy’s Co14rs d’ctntrl~sc~ dg:Phriquc of 1821, which is the main 
subject of Chapter 4, “The Origins of the Basic Concepts of Cauchy’s Analysis.” 
Cauchy’s course is carefully organized and it is the coherence of his logical 
organization, up to the results, that represents the novelty of Cauchy. Grabiner is 
clear about this but offers only a general level of explanation. Cauchy says explic- 
itly that he wants to be rigorous on two questions in particular, one concerning 
divergent series and the other concerning extensions of results from the real to the 
complex numbers 141. Although Grabiner does deal with convergence tests (even 
if she does not insist sufficiently on Cauchy’s failure to recognize uniform conver- 
gence, uniform continuity, etc.), she says almost nothing specific concerning the 
methods which are valid for complex numbers. Indeed, Grabiner writes that 
“results in complex analysis were among his major concerns” [p. I lo], but only 
three short pages are devoted to this aspect, and they offer virtually no details. As 
a result, the reader cannot understand that the Cows of 1821 is organized so that, 
without using derivatives, all necessary ingredients are given for the proof of 
Newton’s binomial theorem, the development in series of (I + XY for complex X, 
1x1 < I, and for all real p. This was quite an achievement at the time. But here 
Grabiner’s lack of precision prevents the reader from understanding both Abel’s 
fundamental paper of 1826, in which the case of the complex p is one objective, as 
well as the future and essential works of Cauchy on complex variables. Even if we 
stay at the level of the Cows of 1821, there is no less effort concerning rigor when 
Cauchy worked on convergent series or when he tried to work on a complex 
exponential! Therefore we miss an important part of what the title of the book 
suggests. This unfortunate limitation may well come from the very conception of 
the book which seems to have limited itself to published papers which focus 
tightly on limits, derivatives, integrals, and the concept of convergence. But isn’t 
it historically and mathematically dangerous not to deal with the development of 
complex analysis on which Cauchy worked during the decade in which his main 
textbooks were published? 
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Thus far we have quickly described all chapters except the second one, which 
deals in 30 pages with the status of foundations in l8th-century calculus. There are 
many interesting remarks in this chapter, especially on Lagrange, but it falls too 
short [5]. One reason is perhaps that Grabiner, in her conclusion of the book, is 
intent upon establishing Cauchy’s indebtedness to the greatest mathematicians of 
the 18th century, like Euler, Lagrange, and d’Alembert, or to some immediate 
aolleagues such as Ampere and Poisson, rather than to “mathematical un- 
knowns” such as Berkeley, Robins, l’Huilier, or L. Carnot who had “philosophi- 
cal discussions” on the calculus. I am sure many readers will be confused by this 
Ilist statement. Either it is a trivial statement (trivial in the accepted meaning of the 
adjective among mathematicians), or it indicates that the works of these “mathe- 
matical unknowns” proved useless and can be ignored by historians. It is trivial to 
say that the works of the greatest mathematicians bear consequences because the 
superlative “greatest” is used by the mathematical community to describe those 
who have produced the most fruitful consequences [6]. In this respect, results 
alone are not sufficient, and Lindemann despite his result on 7~ was not ranked 
among the greatest! But if historians of mathematics try to clarify the works of 
“ mathematical unknowns,” especially in the case of the development of the 
calculus, it is precisely to understand better, as Boyer puts it, a “period of indeci- 
sion.” On this subject, by the way, how should one evaluate the roles of such 
mathematical “knowns” as Lambert or Laplace? 
If we adhere to a strict and limited interpretation of her title, we have in 
Crabiner’s study a very nice book explaining Cauchy’s new methods and the 
evolution of rigor in the calculus during the 18th century. Moreover, the book 
displays in a clear-cut way how most of the proofs taught nowadays in basic 
calculus courses originated in theoretical approximation procedures. The begin- 
ner in mathematics will be pleased to follow the historical path of rigorization, 
from a qualitative description of limits, to some applications of inequalities, and 
finally to the systematic use of 6 and E, which involves the meticulous but impor- 
trmt details of mathematical notations. Moreover, by reading this book the begin- 
ner will learn both mathematics and history of mathematics. With great pedagogi- 
cl1 talent, Grabiner takes care to summarize quite often her findings upon which 
new ideas can be developed. She deserves the success the book will doubtless 
have among historically inclined mathematicians. 
NOTES 
1. See 1. Lakatos, “ Cauchy and the Continuum; the significance of nonstandard analysis for the 
history and philosophy of mathematics,” m Mathematics, science and epistemology. Philosophical 
Papers II, pp. 43-60. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978. 
2. In addition to the bibliographic references included in Grabiner’s work, we should like to add the 
fcllowing recent works about Cauchy: C. Gilain, Edition da cows d’unalyse de Caachy de l’Eco/e 
P?lytechnique “Equations diffkentielles ordinuires.” Paris: Editions Etudes Vivantes, 1981: B. 
Belhoste, A. L. Cauchy et la pratique des sciences exuctes duns la premi)re moit@ da lY@me sipc[e, 
P iris: These de 3eme cycle, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1982. 
3. It may be interesting to add that the revival of Euclidean geometry and its pattern of proof, but 
w th strange additions from function theory, was launched in 1794 by A. M. Legendre. In analysis it 
90 REVIEWS HM 12 
was common in the 17th and 18th centuries to express the desire of emulating the rigor of Greek 
geometry, although little success was achieved until Cauchy. However, one should be very careful not 
to extend too far the similarity of rigor for Euclid and Cauchy. For example, indirect proofs by 
contradiction are common in Euclid. but very rare indeed in Cauchy. Similarly. we can regret (but 
understand) that Grabiner does not try to be more specific about the style of Cauchy’s proofs com- 
pared with those of Archimedes. If the modern reader needs some time to get used to Euler. anyone 
may read the manuals of Cauchy without being puzzled by their style or notation. 
4. Philip Kitcher places special emphasis upon this passage in his recent book. The Nururc~ of 
Matkmatical Knon~ledge, pp. 247-248. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983. 
5. The 18th century witnessed the first serious split between the sciences and the humanities, and we 
may see Berkeley’s efforts as among the last serious ones to avoid a larger gap. In this respect it seems 
historically impossible to explain the development of the calculus in the 18th century only from within 
the mathematical world. This also helps to explain why Chapter 2 of Grabiner’s book is too short. 
6. It is true that the easiest way for a mathematician to learn general historical facts is to look first at 
highlights only. In this respect. the historical notes of N. Bourbaki serve this purpose well, with almost 
nothing to be added. 
